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Who Adds Value to Ventures?
Understanding the Roles and Relative Contributions
of Key Advisors in High-Technology Startups

David Y. Choi*
Loyola Marymount University

and
Martin Stack**
Rockhurst University

During the process of starting and growing a company, entrepreneurs seek help from
their key advisors, which include its directors, advisory board members, financiers, as well as
others informally affiliated with the venture. This paper examines how the various groups add
value to a venture and assesses the relative value of their contributions. Through a survey of
high technology entrepreneurs, we find that directors, advisory board members and informal
advisors add significant value by offering their expertise in various fields. Surprisingly,
investors add relatively little value, even in such key areas as strategic planning and finance.
While professional venture capitalists add more value than private investors, even the venture
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capitalists’ contribution was perceived lower than those of the other advisors in key areas. Our
results suggest that the contributions of investors may have been overestimated in conventional
literature.
Introduction
During the process of starting and growing a company, entrepreneurs seek not only
physical or financial resources, but also expertise, guidance and contacts. Much of the help
comes from the company’s key advisors formally affiliated with the venture. These usually
consist of the company’s board of directors (BOD), the advisory board (AB) and financiers
(INV). Other advisors often include individuals and parties informally affiliated (OTHER),
e.g., personal mentors, business partners or suppliers, who often offer valuable advice to new
businesses. The value-added resources provided by both formal and informal advisors have
long been shown to substantially impact the performance of a venture (Castaldi & Wortman,
1984; Zahra & Pearce, 1985).
In this paper, we examine how and to what extent the various groups add value to a
venture and compare their relative contributions. In particular, we analyze the contributions of
investors  a group often discussed in academic and trade journals, yet still widely
misapprehended in practice. The key questions addressed in this research include:




How and to what extent does each advisory group add value to an entrepreneurial
company? What are the major contributions of each group?
How do their contributions compare? Who adds more value than others?
How valuable are the contributions of venture capitalists (VCs) and private
investors? Do investors really add as much value to new ventures as they often
claim? Is it important for ventures to have value-added investors, i.e., should
entrepreneurs actively seek out certain investors  even if that means lower
valuation or inferior term sheet?

The questions addressed here are particularly relevant for entrepreneurs in the earlier
stages of their operation when they are in the process of formalizing relationships with their
advisors and investors. Entrepreneurs find it useful to know what and how much to expect
from an advisory board member, director or investor; whom other entrepreneurs rely on for
mentorship; or whether or not investors are as good of a source of strategic advice as they claim
to be. Preventing a mismatch in expectations can mitigate future potential conflict.
In particular, there has been much discussion on the topic of value-added investors
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza and Timmons, 1989). Many
investors including VCs claim to add value beyond their financing, through their reputation,
contacts and expertise. Some VC firms market themselves as adding more value than others by
being more “hands-on”. Post-investment stage research has examined the interactions between
entrepreneurs and VCs with inconclusive results (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Rosenstein et al.,
1990, 1989; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Sapienza, 1992;
MacMillan et al., 1988; Ehrlich et al., 1994). Entrepreneurs could benefit a better
understanding of the level of contribution investors make to their ventures.
Previous studies have examined the relationships between entrepreneurs and their
advisors, but this research has usually addressed one group at a time. Our research is unique in
that it quantitatively compares the relative contributions made by all the major constituents
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(BOD, AB and INV) as well as informal advisors (OTHER). This approach allows for new
managerial insights that previous studies were unable to offer.
I.

The Entrepreneurial Organization and its Advisors
Stevenson and Sahlman (1988) have argued that small companies should become more
active in managing their advisors. The following discussion highlights the major research on
the roles and responsibilities of each advisory group:
The Board of Directors (BOD) of an organization commonly consists of key executives,
investors and select outside individuals with relevant expertise. It usually has a controlling,
strategic and service-oriented function in commercial companies (Strebel, 2004; Zahra &
Pearce, 1989; Andrews, 1981). Over the last few decades, several researchers have asserted the
need for successful, privately held firms to have a working board of directors (Danco, 1975,
1981; Heidrick, 1984; Jacobs, 1985). Its role in smaller enterprises is similar – to assist the
company in determining objectives and strategies, provide specialized expertise, and even act
as arbitrators for feuding partners and family members (Danco, 1981; Mace, 1971).
Different boards, depending on their structure, size, composition and commitment, vary
significantly in the level and type of contributions they make. Active and able board members
can add to the capacity of management by giving advice and counsel on problems within the
business. Furthermore, networks mediated by BODs can contribute to increased flexibility in
strategic decision making (Borch & Huse, 1993). Several studies have argued that they should
play a more important role in the strategy development of small business firms (Castaldi &
Wortman, 1984; Huse, 1990; Mace, 1948).
A growing number of high technology ventures rely on official advisory boards (ABs)
with the intention of tapping into the members’ expertise, usually under a formal fee or equity
arrangement. According to Inc. Magazine, ABs are popular in family-held companies, where a
“guidance but not governance” role is well suited to dealing with family owners (Hadzima,
1994). ABs are also common in high technology (including biotechnology) ventures where
special expertise is sought (e.g., clinical trial management). Nevertheless, some practioners
and academics have questioned the roles and benefits of ABs which often maintain loose
arrangements with their ventures (Morkel and Posner 2002). Often, they are viewed as mere
promotional mechanisms to help a company appear credible. Very few studies have attempted
to measure the benefits of having an AB. One exception is Morkel and Posner (2002) who
found in a survey that a substantial percentage of advisory boards (41-60%) may be effective
and value-adding.
Many investors including VCs, claim to add value beyond their financing, e.g., through
avenues such as their reputation, contacts and expertise. Some promise to add more value than
others by being more “hands-on”. Post-investment stage research has examined the
interactions between entrepreneurs and VCs with inconclusive results (Hellmann and Puri,
2002; Rosenstein et al., 1990, 1989; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza and Timmons,
1989; Sapienza, 1992; MacMillan et al., 1988; Ehrlich et al., 1994). For example, GomesMejia et al. (1990) assert that many CEOs viewed VC managerial intervention as
counterproductive, while Hellmann and Puri (2002) and Sapienza (1992) find that VCs’
involvement can make positive contributions to the performance of ventures.
Although many studies have examined the contributions of VCs, most fail to compare
them to those of other advisors, such as the ABs and BODs. One notable exception is
Rosenstein (1989), who found that CEOs of ventures did not perceive that VCs on their boards
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added more value than other board members. It is important for entrepreneurs to understand
the level of support VCs provide, especially for the more promising entrepreneurs for whom
investment is not critical for survival or who are offered multiple term sheets from VC firms
each claiming to offer good advice. Ehrlich et al. (994) find that VC firms require significant
reporting and management time, while Hsu (2004) points out that VC financing, especially
those from better known firms, can be very costly to entrepreneurs.
Another important source of advice for ventures include friends, mentors, service
providers (such as consultants, attorneys and bankers), and business partners (including
suppliers and customers) whom we group together under “OTHER” or as informal advisors.
They make significant contributions for ventures usually without having formal financial
arrangements for the services they provide. Some of these people, inside the personal or
extended networks of entrepreneurs, can significantly impact the performance of an
organization (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991). McGrath et al. (2003) found that software executives
looking for advice tended to call upon people whom they knew well and that these advice
networks were an important source of information about business, technical, and social issues.
The entrepreneurial community appears filled with anecdotes of mentors, attorneys or suppliers
who have made significant contributions to ventures – going well beyond the call of their duty.
Despite the importance of these informal advisors, few studies have examined their
contributions.
II.

Value-Adding Activities
We developed a short list of value-adding activities for our study. We began with the
20 investor involvement activities discussed in MacMillan et al. (1988) and Ehrlich et al.
(1994). For practical reasons, we shortened the list to 8 activities after a series of brainstorming
sessions with an initial sample of entrepreneurs. While this is not an exhaustive list, it covers
some of the most important contributions that entrepreneurs expect from their advisors.
Credibility. An early stage venture with little history can immediately gain a certain
level of credibility by associating itself with established individuals or organizations (Hubbard,
2000). Such a boost in credibility can facilitate meetings with partners and customers that a
new venture may otherwise be unable to arrange. Thus, advisors or investors who can add to
credibility can make a significant impact on an organization’s performance.
Technical Expertise.
Strong technical expertise can significantly impact the
performance of a venture. One of the primary roles of a BOD or an AB member is to provide
relevant expertise to an organization (Strebel, 2004, Danco, 1981; Mace, 1971). Most venture
capitalists usually have an industry focus, enabling them to provide specific skills, such as
customer understanding to their portfolio companies (Sapienza, 1992; Gorman & Sahlman,
1989).
Financial Expertise. Financial expertise is important for a wide range of activities such
as financial control, cash management, raising capital and interfacing with investor groups.
Many entrepreneurs have little practical experience with many aspects of financial
management. Even those with financial experience often prefer to receive guidance from their
advisors. In a study of entrepreneurial firms that received equity investments, Ehrlich et al.
(1994) found that interfacing with investor groups, obtaining alternative equity financing and
monitoring financial performance were among the top activities for which entrepreneurs sought
help from their lead investors.
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Business & Marketing Strategies. One of the board’s primary responsibilities is to
assist in determining the objectives and strategies of its company (Strebel, 2004, Danco, 1981;
Mace, 1971). Studies show evidence that both strategic planning and outside assistance can
have a positive impact on venture performance (Chrisman, 1989; Bracker & Pearson, 1986).
Formulating business strategy and serving as a “sounding board” are among the top activities in
which ventures wanted involvement from their investors (Ehrlich, 1994; MacMillan, 1981).
Sales Leads & Contacts. Few contributions are of more direct benefit for an early stage
enterprise than assistance with sales or promising sales leads. A well-connected group of
advisors can often be the source of early sales leads. MacMillan (1983) asserts that building
relevant contacts and networks is a key factor in any firm’s success – which directors and other
advisors often bring.
Entrepreneur Mentoring. An entrepreneur’s personal capacity as a manager and a
leader undoubtedly has an impact on the performance of his or her organization. Mentoring
may come in a wide range of areas including leadership, personnel management, operational
management or technical knowledge. Saxenian (2002) discovers that mentoring plays an
important role in the success of Asian American entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley.
Recruiting & Staffing. The success of an enterprise depends heavily on having the
right management and technical talent. Entrepreneurs often rely on their advisors to identify
managers with needed capabilities. Sanford et al. (1994) confirmed that entrepreneurs
frequently sought expertise in the area of staffing from their investors.
Managerial Systems & Control. First-time entrepreneurs need substantial guidance in
developing organization charts and reporting structures and in implementing compensation
incentives, hiring protocols and operational processes. Some studies have suggested that
entrepreneurs viewed operational and administrative issues as their most important concerns in
starting a new business (Davis, Jones & Kraft, 1981; Voziki & Glueck, 1980).
III.

Method
The main part of our survey asks the respondents to rate the level of contributions of
each of the 4 groups – AB, BOD, INV and OTHER. A seven-point Likert scale ranging from
“Insignificant” to “Very significant (positively changing the fortune of the company)” was used
for each of the 8 contribution categories.
To create a pool of potential respondents, we tapped into the MBA alumni pool from
UCLA and USC, the University of Chicago and the University of Pennsylvania. Almost all
communication was conducted via email. Out of 112 participants, 51 (45%) surveys were
complete and relevant.
Surveys were discarded when a company did not have a working BOD or an outside
INV. We also rejected surveys whose BODs did not have at least one outside board member
who was not a lead investor. In 55% of our sample, the BOD had at least 1 non-investor
outside member, many of whom were former executives and industry experts. On the average,
our sample had fewer non-investor outside board members (average 0.7) than Rosenstein et al.
(1993) whose sample had 1.3 non-investor outside board members. We attribute this difference
to the fact that our sample had more early stage companies. A board member who was a
professional investor (angel or VC) was categorized as an investor, not as a director, in our
analysis. Overall, 25 of our companies had professional VCs as lead investors; 23 had private
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individuals or angel investors as lead investors; and for the remaining 3 companies strategic
investors were the lead investors.
In our final sample, 32 respondents stated that they had at least one OTHER advisor
who added value to their businesses. Participants were asked to identify who, other than an
INV or member of an AB or the BOD, provided the most help to identify their OTHER
advisors. They included former angel investors, business partners (including Intel and
Microsoft), retired executives, and personal acquaintances.
Some additional profile information of our final sample is as follows:
 The entrepreneurs were between the ages 33 and 48, with the median age of 41
 They all had MBAs from top 25 business schools
 The majority (72%) lived in Southern California.
 They were all in technology, most (75%) were in IT (software, computer and
electronics) with the remaining (25%) in biotechnology
 Their companies were in business between 1 and (minimum requirement) 5 years,
with an average of 2.4 years.
 Their companies ranged from 0 to $50M in revenue and from 4 to 245 employees.
IV.

Results
Table I lists the mean values obtained from the survey for the level of contributions
made by each of the advisor groups. Overall results indicate that AB, BOD and OTHER made
similar average contributions (3.8, 3.8, 3.7), while the average contribution from INV was
smaller (3.1). It is noteworthy that AB and BOD made significant contributions in Technology
Expertise, Financial Expertise and Strategy while INV lagged behind consistently. OTHER
seemed particularly effective in Mentoring.
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was utilized to examine if the differences in
the means were similar or significantly different. F-tests show that the mean contribution
levels were not significantly different between the groups in Sales Leads & Contacts and in
Recruiting & Staffing. This makes sense considering that neither activity is considered the
primary responsibility of any group.
On the other hand, the ANOVA results indicated that a more thorough examination was
necessary for the other activities. Various combinations of paired t-tests were run to confirm
the following observation summarized in Table II.
It is clear from the results that ABs added more than just Credibility or name value.
They were also highly valued for their contributions to Technical Expertise and Strategy. The
BOD also played an important role. It was instrumental in adding to Strategy and Financial
Expertise, and it added more value in Systems & Control than any other group. Interestingly,
INVs added the least amount of value to ventures (other than through their financial
investments). One might have assumed that they would be more involved and motivated to add
value. Another surprising finding was the level of contributions made by OTHER. Although
in many cases they received no formal compensation, these unofficial advisors added
significant value through Mentoring and other activities. Their level of contribution was not
significantly different from AB and BOD in Credibility, Strategy, and Financial Expertise.
Having observed that INVs contributed relatively little to ventures, we examined if
there were any differences in the contribution levels between private investors and professional
VCs. We divided our sample of 51 respondents into 25 companies whose lead investor was a
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VC and 23 whose lead investor was a private individual (3 were strategic investors). Results
are illustrated in Table III.
We found that VCs added significantly more value with respect to Financial Expertise,
in such activities as planning, managing cash and follow-on financing. This makes sense since
VCs have stronger financial backgrounds than private investors.
V.

Discussion
The results of our study are generally consistent with those of prior studies. This
research corroborates the value of having a working BOD as asserted in Strebel (2004), Danco
(1981, 1975), Heidrick (1984) and Jacobs (1985). Furthermore, it suggests that a BOD
excluding the investors can add significant value to a venture. This makes sense considering
that many of the non-investor BOD members are deliberately recruited for their strong
expertise in one or more areas. Many of them also have operating experiences, which many
investors do not.
We note that ABs can add significant value to a venture, particularly by providing
Credibility, Strategy and Technical Expertise. Many early stage ventures are able to recruit
high-profile individuals to be in the advisory board, in part because these roles require minimal
commitment. Nevertheless, once on board, AB members appear to add significant value.
Our findings show that the category OTHER can add significant value to a company,
particularly through personal mentoring. We learned that some entrepreneurs were unwilling
to confide with their BODs or INVs for certain issues and turned to their personal advisors for
help. In most situations, entrepreneurs sought advice from people they trusted and had personal
relationships with, consistent with findings by McGrath et al. (2003). Detailed interviews
revealed that some of the OTHER advisors were individuals sufficiently qualified to be BOD or
AB members but were not interested in an official arrangement. Overall, the data show that
significant contributions were made by individuals without any formal ties (e.g., pay or equity)
to the organization.
On the other hand, INVs add much less value than might be expected. While
counterintuitive at first, anecdotes and explanations provided by the surveyed entrepreneurs
helped validate our observation. “Investors are chosen for their ability to write a check, not for
their ability to help”, one interviewee clarified. “In comparison to their marketing pitch, their
contribution was disappointing,” said another. Most survey participants, when they were
shared the results – particularly the low scores of investors – expressed that they were not
surprised. One entrepreneur of a biotech company even described how a VC group nearly
destroyed his company with poor hiring moves.
Comparing the value-added of VCs to BODs, we find that VCs have a lower mean in
most situations. However, these differences are not statistically significant except for Strategy.
This finding is similar to Rosenstein (1993), where contributions of VCs on boards were found
to be not significantly different from those of other board members.
As one might have expected, VCs provided more Financial Expertise than private
investors. This result is consistent with Ehrlich et al. (1994), where the major difference
between VCs and private investors was that VCs were more involved with obtaining alternative
equity and debt financing, monitoring financial performance and serving as a sounding board.
Apart from Financial Expertise, our results show no other statistically significant difference
between VCs and private investors.

82

Our results do not imply that investors do not add any value in the absolute sense. They
clearly do, as confirmed by our results and other studies such as Gorman & Sahlman (1989)
and Sapienza (1992). Certainly, a group of intelligent individuals can provide useful advice.
However, the celebrated stories of legendary investors who can elevate a startup dramatically in
a very short time are far less common than reported in popular press or often expected by
entrepreneurs.
Furthermore, our results raise new questions about the true importance of landing valueadding investors, something widely stressed in real life and in academic literature. While
receiving investment from experienced and influential venture capitalists would be very
helpful, there appears to be little need for ventures to limit themselves to such investors only.
Our findings suggest that there may be other parties as well or better equipped to help ventures
than the VCs. If entrepreneurs are able to obtain the expertise they need from a wide range of
people (and our data suggest that entrepreneurs should do so actively), they might as well align
themselves with investors who offer the best terms.
VI.

Conclusion
It is important to note that the study has some limitations. First, it was conducted
mostly from a homogeneous group within a single region working in similar industries. Thus,
these findings may not apply to others, e.g., those who don’t have the comparable educational
or business background of our sample or who work in other industries. For example,
entrepreneurs with little management experience might have found more value in the advice of
their financiers. Similarly, entrepreneurs with weaker personal connections than our sample
might have found their investors to be more important.
Only a few of the VCs in our sample would be classified as “first-class” VCs as
described by MacMillan et al. (1989). The recent years have seen a significant rise in the
number of VCs, many with limited credentials and capabilities. Our results might have been
different if all our investors had been first-class VCs. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that
not all entrepreneurs funded by first-class VCs are satisfied with the support they receive. One
interviewee, who had received investment from one of the premier VC firms in Silicon Valley,
complained about the lack of help he had received. He also added that only those companies
overseen directly by the two legendary senior partners of the VC firm received adequate
assistance. He felt that the other partners and associates of this prestigious VC firm neither had
the experience nor the contacts to significantly help his and other ventures.
The research could be extended in many ways. One research idea may be to extend this
paper and the work of Stevenson and Sahlman (1988) to examine effective means of managing
one’s advisors. Another idea may be to develop a better understanding of the informal advisors
who are often so helpful to the success of a new venture. It would be interesting to explore
who they are and what motivates them to help.
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Table I
Contribution

Advisory
Board
Credibility
4.7
Technical
4.2
Financial
4.2
Strategy
4.5
Sales Leads
3.8
Mentoring
3.7
Recruiting
2.5
Systems
2.8
Average
3.8
*p < 0.05 **p<0.01

Board of
Directors1
4.5
3.6
4.2
4.5
3.4
3.8
2.5
4.2
3.8

OTHER

INV

df

F

4.4
3.0
3.7
4.1
3.9
4.3
3.0
2.8
3.7

3.9
3.0
3.2
3.1
3.4
2.7
2.3
3.4
3.1

3,161
3,160
3,159
3,161
3,160
3,159
3,161
3,161

3.3*
7.2**
4.8*
14.1**
1.76
9.2**
1.5
6.1**

1. Excludes the lead investor who is often on the Board

Table II

Contribution
Credibility
Technical
Financial
Strategy
Sales Leads
Mentoring
Recruiting
Systems

Key results of paired t-tests
Significant
Not significant
AB, BOD, OTHER > INVs (with p<0.01)
AB > INV, OTHER (with p<0.01)
AB, BOD > INVs (with p<0.05)
AB, BOD > INVs (with p<0.05)
OTHER > INV (with p<0.01)
BOD > AB, INV and OTHER (with p<0.01)

AB, BOD, OTHER
AB, BOD
AB, BOD from OTHER
AB, BOD from OTHER
AB, BOD, INV, OTHER
OTHER from AB, BOD
AB, BOD, INV, OTHER
AB, INV, OTHER
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Table III

Contribution

Private
investors
Credibility
4.2
Technical
2.6
Financial
2.7
Strategy
3.2
Sales Leads
3.6
Mentoring
2.9
Recruiting
2.6
Systems
3.4
Average
3.1
*p < 0.05 **p<0.01

Venture
Capitalist
3.8
3.1
3.7
3.4
3.4
3.1
2.2
4.0
3.3

t-statistic
1.04
1.62
2.88**
1.35
0.46
1.47
0.83
1.32

